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In the Courts: Sentencing Juvenile Offenders 
 
By Hsin-Hsin Lee 
 
Society generally perceives juvenile gang activities as “bad choices” on the part 
of the youth, and the youth are often punished as such in the juvenile justice systems. In 
fact, anti-gang initiatives such as California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act attaches significant sentence enhancements that are applied without 
consideration of the offender’s age. However, as the courts began to recognize cognitive 
differences in children and adults, there is a potential future trend for U.S. courts to 
perceive youth involvement in gangs as a form of labor trafficking as opposed to bad 
decision-making on the part of the youth that deserves to be punished. This change will 
drastically alter juvenile court sentencing as juvenile gang members are perceived as 
“victims” instead of “perpetrators.” This view follows the judicial trend to sentence 
juveniles differently than adults because they are not fully emotionally developed, and as 
evidenced by the holdings in Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, People v. Gutierrez, 
People v. Cabellero, and People v. Com, it is readily apparent that juveniles involved in 
gangs require a different approach to sentencing. 
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that mandatorily sentencing 
juveniles to life without parole is a violation of the “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause of the Eight Amendment. In Graham v. Florida, the Court stated that juveniles 
must be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.” The Court reasoned that a life-without-parole sentence 
imposed on youth who have committed non-homicide crimes is unconstitutional because 
it “improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.” 
This holding acknowledged that juvenile offenders differ from their adult counterparts as 
juveniles are more likely to be “rehabilitated”; and further placed a ban that prohibits the 
state from sentencing a juvenile non-homicide offender to life without parole. 
Nonetheless, the state retains the option to sentence juvenile offenders to life with a 
possibility of parole. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court reinforced the Graham decision in Miller v. Alabama 
by holding that states cannot impose mandatory life without parole sentences on juveniles. 
The Miller decision is important because of its focus on physiological and developmental 
differences that set juvenile offenders apart from adults. The Miller court recognized that 
children lack the life experience necessary to properly balance risk and reward, and are 
therefore more likely than adults to engage in high-risk behavior for short-term gains. In 
Miller, the Court summarized the factors that make juvenile offenders less culpable than 
adults as: (1) they are less able to assess risk; (2) they are more susceptible to outside 
influences; and (3) they do not have a fully-developed character.  
These three concerns opined in Miller are very apt when applied to gang settings. 
Author and gang expert Dan Korem states that the most common explanation for youths’ 
choices to join dangerous street gangs is the failure of family and similar support 
mechanisms, which he calls the “missing protector factor.” Societal changes like rising 
divorce rates, increasing numbers of mothers in the workforce, and the failure of public 
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schools to properly educate youths “have posed challenges particularly for poor families, 
and also for racial and ethnic minorities.” Given this background, the gang context 
magnifies juveniles’ inability to accurately assess the riskiness of their behavior because 
the promise of acceptance as a gang member may cause juveniles to lower their moral 
standards. Secondly, the gang context magnifies the effects of juveniles’ susceptibility to 
negative influences. The Miller court noted that juveniles are highly susceptible to 
negative influences from their peers and family, similar to how joining a gang brings 
juveniles into an environment in which peers are more likely to be engaging in delinquent 
behaviors. Lastly, the Miller court noted that juvenile acts are less likely to be predictive 
of the offender’s future conduct, which remains true in gang settings as juveniles are 
often willing to terminate their gang participation for other types of peer groups. 
In People v. Caballero, a juvenile defendant was convicted of three counts of 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempt of murder and inflicted great bodily injury 
upon one victim for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The Supreme Court of 
California concluded that a one hundred-year-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile who 
was not convicted of a homicide contravenes Graham’s mandate against cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Caballero court reiterated that 
the state is not required to “guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile convicted of a non-
homicide offense.” Additionally, the Caballero court observed that Miller had extended 
Graham’s reasoning that juvenile homicide offenders should be given the opportunity to 
be rehabilitated, but refrained from extending Graham’s categorical ban on life without 
parole from non-homicide offenders to homicide offenders. 
In People v. Gutierrez, the California Supreme Court held that juveniles who have 
been convicted of special circumstance murder could each be sentenced to receive a life 
sentence. The Gutierrez court outlined five factors from the Miller decision for a 
sentencing court in juvenile homicide cases: (1) a juvenile offender’s chronological age 
and his or her hallmark features; (2) the family and home environment that surrounds the 
juvenile; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense; (4) whether the offender might 
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incapacities associated with 
youth; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation. Nonetheless, the court shall still evaluate 
whether each of the juveniles can be determined, at the time of sentencing, to be 
“irreparably corrupt beyond redemption, and thus unfit ever to reenter society, 
notwithstanding the ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform’ that 
ordinarily distinguish juveniles from adults.” In sum, the Gutierrez court once again 
confirms that environmental and circumstantial factors must be considered when the 
sentence involves a minor. Consequently, courts are required to consider underlying 
reasons, such as the “missing protector factor,” for a juvenile’s gang involvement in 
evaluating the juvenile offender’s culpability.  
In Commonwealth v. Batts, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized 
Miller’s holding that the imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence on a 
minor offender was unconstitutional. The defendant admitted that he was inducted into a 
gang and he shot the victims because he thought it was the instruction of senior gang 
members. He also admitted that he was promoted to a higher ranking within the gang 
after the murder. The Batts court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
2
Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol35/iss2/7
2015]                                                    In the Courts                                                       187                            
	  
entirely foreclose the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender 
but quoted the Miller majority in stating that the occasion for such punishment would be 
“uncommon,” accounting for “how children are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a life in prison.” The Pennsylvania court 
ultimately decided that the remedy for a constitutional violation was to remand for a new 
sentencing hearing at which the trial court could consider the factors detailed in Miller v. 
Alabama. In weighing these factors, the trial court retains the discretion to impose a life 
sentence either with or without parole. Ultimately, the Batts decision is instructive in 
demonstrating that although the courts have not completely banned life without parole as 
a sentencing option from juvenile homicide cases, the courts are vigilant in ensuring that 
all environmental and circumstantial factors are considered before a minor is barred from 
ever reentering society. 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that youths and adults have 
physiological and developmental differences, an even greater emphasis is placed on the 
“possibility of rehabilitation” when the sentencing involves a minor. The repeatedly-
outlined Miller sentencing factors is a primary example of how the courts would weigh 
the “missing protector factor” in evaluating a juvenile gang member’s culpability and 
possibility of redemption in a crime. Although recent cases have not made a statement on 
how juvenile gang membership affects sentencing, the courts have repeatedly emphasized 
sentencing factors that account for a juvenile offender’s environmental and circumstantial 
background. Nonetheless, Graham and Miller’s clarification that eventual freedom is not 
guaranteed for juvenile offenders illustrates that the court has not yet made the full shift 
to view the juvenile gang offenders as victims of labor trafficking. In spite of the state 
courts’ current stance, the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized that juvenile 
offenders are less culpable than adults is a hopeful sign that the courts will gradually 
perceive a minor’s involvement in gangs as labor trafficking rather than the minor’s bad 
decision-making skills.   
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